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It is traditionally contended that politics and law are two separate domains of international re-
lations among the main actors, states. As opposed to this thinking, international relations of the 
twenty-first century have been characterized by the continuing interaction of law and politics. 
As the main actors and participants in international law, states played and still play significant 
roles in this development. The growing sense of nationalism within states and the concomitant 
consequence of prioritizing their respective national interests led to the use, by these states, of 
international law as an instrument of justification.  When international law is used this way, 
politics, and law inevitably confluence to serve the interests of those states with strong national 
objectives that they seek to achieve in any way possible. International trade has become very 
essential in international relations more than ever while it at the same time is affected by the 
political decisions of states at different levels. When the World Trade Organization was esta-
blished (January 1, 1995), its first aim was to institutionalize the international trade relation 
among states so that more trade liberalization and integration would be achieved. It has been 
doing a remarkable job in working towards a more integrated world through its laws, systems, 
and institutions. The WTO Dispute Settlement System, with its establishing agreement (Dispute 
Settlement Understanding) and adjudicating bodies, is such a crucial system of the WTO with a 
good reputation in the past two decades. It has a complex procedure consisting of both political 
negotiation and adjudication in the judicial process. This paper limits itself to examining how 
political decisions by Member states within the WTO affect the WTO dispute settlement system’s 
progress to ‘judicialization’ of its adjudication process.
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I. INTRODUCTION
International law, simply understood as a set of rules that countries agree 
to follow in their relations with each other, has evolved through time. Al-
though there is no world government with the authority of establishing a set 
of international law principles backed by sanction just like the way domestic 
laws come into effect, international law still plays a significant role in shaping 
the relationship between states. International law, except its binding function 
in international society, has “the communicative function, the function of em-
bodying shared understandings of international society and the justifying and 
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legitimating function”.1 The peaceful coexistence of states is realized only 
when nations are willing to coordinate and accommodate their interests. In-
ternational law, to fulfill its communicative function, sets the rules for states 
on how to communicate and regulates their relations. The second of the listed 
above presupposes the communicative function and serves to create shared 
ideas among the global community taking into account the diversity of the 
needs of the international society.2 Regarding the third, the justifying and le-
gitimating function, states tend to use international law to justify their actions 
and deny the legitimacy of the actions of the opposing state.3 It is this third 
and last function of international law which is the subject matter of the present 
article in specific reference to WTO’s dispute resolution system. 
Even if the concept of the rule of law has been adopted at the national 
level, making state actors bound by their domestic laws, the core principle 
of the rule of law, “according to which all actors are equal before the law” 
was not given effect at the international level until recently.4 In other words, 
states were not equally bound by international law principles and there were 
states whose sovereignty rights were much broader than others. The absence 
of an ‘international’ judiciary with the mandate to provide the institutional 
safeguard forcing states to comply with their international legal obligations 
rendered the principle of “equality before the law” under international law 
almost ineffective. Since “the more powerful states were able to do as they 
pleased while the less powerful states had to suffer what they must”, there was 
no legal guarantee “that like cases of breaches of international law would be 
treated alike.”5 The institutionalization of international law was necessary to 
bring states together and limit the exercise of their sovereignty rights in favor 
of the rule of law at the international level. 
The era of globalization witnessed the dramatic growth of the significance 
of international organizations in international relations. Martin and Simmons 
(2002) emphasized that international organizations became common phenom-
ena of international life following the growth in treaty arrangements among 
states, the deepening of regional integration efforts in different parts of the 
world, and the gradual institutionalization of international politics.6 Among 
1  Onuma Yasuaki “International Law in and with International Politics: The Functions of International Law 
in International Society” EJIL 14  (2003): 130.
2  Ibid., 134.
3  Ibid., 136.
4 Achim Helmedach and Bernhard Zangl, “Dispute Settlement Under GATT and WTO: An Empirical En-
quiry into a Regime Change” in Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance And Social Regulation 
(Studies in International Trade Law) Christian Joerges and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds.  (Hart Publishing, 
2006), 85.
5  Ibid.
6 Lisa Martin and Beth Simmons, “International Organizations and Institutions,” in Handbook of Inter-
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many international organizations, the United Nations facilitates international 
diplomacy, the World Health Organization coordinates international public 
health and protection, and the World Trade Organization (WTO) monitors and 
regulates international trade among states.7 WTO in general and its dispute 
settlement system, in particular, emerged in the 1990s as a full-fledged and 
organized international system to integrate international trade to achieve more 
liberalization. 
WTO as a global trading system represents the confluence of three distinct 
areas of theory and practice: law, economics, and politics.8 Although this topic 
is beyond the scope of this article, it’s noteworthy to mention that these three 
factors have each played a certain role in bringing countries with different 
levels of economic development and political power together to work towards 
the creation and maintenance of a rules-based regime with reduced barriers to 
trade.9 WTO works for the implementation of the various agreements which 
member states have signed and undertaken as a single package for the re-
alization of free trade and effective liberalization. These agreements cover 
various and wide issues which are very essential to WTO members to the 
extent that the members are very sensitive to any interpretation or application 
of these WTO agreements. That is why disputes are expected to occur very 
frequently. Every WTO member considers the WTO agreements in terms of 
their own priorities and policies. As a result, they do not always agree on de-
ciding whether one way or another is the correct way of applying WTO rules. 
The WTO has developed a system that deals with settling disputes among its 
members regarding their multilateral agreements.
Given the significance of international trade in the contemporary world 
on the one hand, and states’ growing tendency to justify their actions through 
international laws and agreements, on the other hand, assessing how the WTO 
seeks to balance between legality and politics within its dispute settlement 
system helps to catch up with what the next trend is in international trade law. 
This study is primarily normative research which is focused on the study of 
WTO Agreements, more specifically WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understand-
ing (DSU) and other relevant instruments to do a comprehensive analysis of 
the extent to which politics and law are in confluence in WTO’s DSS. The re-
search also adopts a historical approach to briefly assess how the regulation of 
national Relations, Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, Beth A. Simmons, eds. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications, 2002), 192.
7  SUNY Levin Institute, “International Law and Organizations, A Project of SUNY Levin Institute: 2”, 
https://www.globalization101.org/uploads/File/Inter/interall.pdf (Accessed on 8 August 2019).





international trade evolved and the potential linkage that might exist between 
the legal evolution and WTO’s current status. To cover the practical aspect of 
the confluence of law and politics within WTO in general and the dispute reso-
lution in particular, and reflect on the possible implication of such influence 
on WTO’s journey to more judicialization, the study uses case approach and 
thereby discusses relevant cases which are believed to show the real picture. 
The study is a library-based one involving a survey of the literature. Rel-
evant WTO legal texts; Panel and Appellate Body Reports of specific cases 
are explored as primary sources. Relevant books, scholarly articles, and work-
ing papers are also examined as secondary sources with the view to assess the 
extent to which politics is influencing WTO’s DSS and the possible implica-
tions of such influence on the system’s effort to attain more judicialization. 
Moreover, the internet and relevant websites are also utilized as secondary 
sources in this study.
 The article has four sections and the first section is all about introductory 
remarks regarding globalization and the resultant changes which have and still 
are affecting the state-to-state relations in various sectors. The second section 
addresses how WTO came into the picture in the regulation of international 
trade; then the third section explores WTO’s DSS, how political decisions by 
member states have impacted the adjudication process of the WTO both at 
the consultation and post-decision or execution stage; whether adjudication 
through pure legal reasoning is necessary and attainable under the current 
WTO dispute resolution framework. It also discusses what implication of this 
influence on the effort of WTO’s adjudication process to attain more judicial-
ization. The fourth section makes concluding remarks based on the discus-
sions made in the previous sections.
II. REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE UNDER 
THE WTO
Historically two major interests of states created a paradox whose reso-
lution would result, among others, in the emergence of a multilateral trad-
ing order regulated by international law. The first interest is related to the 
sovereignty of states which enable them to have the authority of deciding 
their fates, whereas the second interest is the need for international cooper-
ation whereby countries needed to put restrictions on the exercise of their 
sovereignty rights. Grasstek (2013) stated that “international law needed to 
be devised and respected, including the forms and norms of diplomacy, pro-
tocol, treaties, conferences and eventually the establishment of international 
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organizations” to regulate such international cooperation among states and 
ensure that these states still had their sovereign authorities.10 It was during this 
process of developing comprehensive bodies of international law through the 
signing of treaties and agreements that states began to institutionalize trade 
relations among themselves so that more trade liberalization and integration 
would be achieved. 
Despite various efforts, it was impossible for states to reach an agreement 
to establish an international organization for the regulation of international 
trade until the 1990s which was the time when the WTO was created. The 
WTO is thus the result of this long-term process which can be taken as a major 
step for the economic regulation of international trade which was essentially 
structured within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) since 
1947. Nevertheless, the competition between states’ sovereignty on the one 
hand, and their desire to create a global order where their sovereign pow-
ers are compromised to some extent on the other hand has been and still is a 
challenge for the establishment of an independent body of international law 
to which states are fully committed regardless of their national interests and 
political goals. 
Eight rounds of tariff negotiations were held during the GATT 1947 years 
(between 1947 and 1994): Geneva (1947), Annecy (1949), Torquay (1950-51), 
Geneva (1956), Geneva (1960-61) - also known as the Dillon Round, the Ken-
nedy Round (1964-67), the Tokyo Round (1973-79) and the Uruguay Round 
(1986-94).11 The Uruguay Round is regarded as the largest trade negotiation in 
history not only because it covered almost all sectors of trade but also because 
123 states took part in the negotiation process.12 Most importantly, it was dur-
ing this round that the creation of WTO was finally made possible when an 
agreement was signed by ministers from most of the 123 participating govern-
ments at a meeting in Marrakesh, Morocco in 1994.13 Following the signing of 
a deal, WTO came into being in 1995.
The Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization usually re-
ferred to as the WTO Agreement and alternatively, as the Marrakesh Agree-
ment, is an agreement adopted as a legal instrument to implement the results 
of the Uruguay Round and to establish the World Trade Organization. The 
Agreement serves as a framework for future multilateral trade negotiations 
10 Ibid.
11 World Trade Organization, “GATT Bilateral Negotiating Material by Round,” accessed 12 August 2019, 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/gattbilaterals_e/indexbyround_e.htm 





and comprises general provisions on the WTO’s organization, membership, 
decision-making, etc.14 All the other multilateral WTO Agreements are rec-
ognized as Annexes to and integral parts15 of this Agreement making mem-
bership to the WTO a single-package deal where a state desiring to become 
a member of the WTO has to agree to be subject to all the multilateral agree-
ments annexed to the WTO Agreement.
Article I of the WTO Agreement establishes the WTO as an international 
organization with its main objectives16 explained in the preamble of the Agree-
ment. The WTO as an institution is structured at different levels including the 
Ministerial Conference, the General Council, the Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB), the Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB), specialised councils, com-
mittees, working groups, and working parties. It incorporates judicial, other 
non-political bodies, and the WTO Secretariat. The Ministerial Conference is 
the highest body of the WTO with various powers granted to it.17 The General 
Council is the second highest body of the WTO with far-reaching functions 
such as assuming full powers of the Ministerial Conference whenever the lat-
ter is not in session18, carrying out management activities within the WTO, 
functions of dispute settlement19 , and trade policy review.20
The General Council, composed of ambassador-level diplomats, is one of 
WTO’s political institutions acting as three different bodies depending on the 
functions it gives, meaning when the General Council administers the WTO 
dispute settlement system, it serves as the DSB21 and when it administers the 
WTO trade policy review mechanism, it stands as the TPRB.22 Thus, it is plau-
sible to state that the General Council, the DSB, and the TPRB are the same 
body, the latter two being mere emanations from the former even if both the 
DSB and the TPRB have developed their own respective Rules of Procedures 
taking into account the special features of their responsibilities.23
One of the essential functions of the WTO is the administration of the dis-
14  METI, “Overview of the WTO Agreements” METI, Accessed on 12 August 2019, https://www.meti.
go.jp/english/report/downloadfiles/2011WTO/2-0Overview.pdf. 
15 Article II (2) of the WTO Agreement.
16 See also Article III of the WTO Agreement on the functions of the WTO.
17 Article IV (1), Article VI (2) and Article X of the WTO Agreement are instances of the authorities of 
WTO’s Ministerial Conference.
18 Article IV (2) of the WTO Agreement.
19 Article IV (3) of the WTO Agreement.
20 Article IV (4) of the WTO Agreement.
21 Article IV (3) of the WTO Agreement.
22 Article IV (4) of the WTO Agreement.
23  Peter van den Bossche and Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, 
Cases and Materials, 4th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 133,134.
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pute settlement system.24 The DSB, being political in nature, is a body at the 
highest level of the WTO’s dispute settlement system. However, WTO’s DSS 
also has judicial and quasi-judicial bodies which are the standing Appellate 
Body and the ad hoc dispute settlement panels respectively.25 These bodies 
operate based on the provisions of WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding 
with the objective of providing security and predictability to the multilateral 
trading system.26 
III. THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM: POLITI-
CAL NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN THE ADJUDICATION 
PROCESS
Although WTO’s dispute settlement system was based on the dispute set-
tlement system of the GATT 1947 which was primarily a power-based system 
of dispute settlement through diplomatic negotiations, it evolved into a rules-
based system of dispute settlement through adjudication.27 Hence, the WTO 
dispute settlement system is taken as a step forward in the effort of transform-
ing the settlement of international disputes to progressive ‘judicialization’.28 
Judicialization of WTO’s dispute settlement process understood for the 
purpose of this article as the process of bringing the system under the remit 
of law by diminishing the impact of politics, begun when WTO adopted the 
DSU on 1st January 1995. When WTO’s rule-based system of adjudication 
replaced GATT 1947’s diplomacy-oriented power-based system, this new dis-
pute settlement mechanism was praised because it “puts an end to the law of 
the jungle, where might is right. Rules are the weak’s best guarantee for the 
future.”29 Because WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism is strictly binding 
empowered with complex decision-making procedures, WTO member states 
are obliged to rely on its adjudicating bodies and judicial means to solve their 
trade-related disputes covered under WTO agreements. It is relatively very ef-
fective in bringing member states under the rule of law when compared to its 
predecessor, GATT 1947.
WTO’s DSS is seen as a reflection of the victory of law over politics as a 
system more fully subjects powerful developed countries to the rule of law in 
24 Ibid., 102. 
25 Ibid, 139.
26 Article 3 (2) of WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding.
27  van den Bossche & Zdouc, The Law and Policy of WTO, 296
28  Ibid.
29  Don Moon, “Equality and Inequality in the WTO Dispute Settlement (DS) System: Analy-
sis of the GATT/WTO Dispute Data”, International Interactions 32:3 (2006): 201, 202. https://doi.
org/10.1080/03050620600837841 (Accessed on 02 May 2020).
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their international economic relations.30 The process, however, is complicated 
in that most international relations are governed by politics whereby interna-
tional law is claimed to serve as an instrument to cover the political decisions 
made by the most powerful states. International trade is not free from this 
problem and the WTO system is criticised for incorporating rules and agree-
ments whose contents are advantageous and more favourable to developed 
countries but unfavourable to developing countries.31 Hence, when the adju-
dicating bodies of WTO’s dispute settlement system give legal interpretations 
and judicial decisions based on these WTO Agreements, it is unlikely for them 
to prevent power disparities among member states and “produce more equi-
table outcomes”.32 Moreover, the Panel and the Appellate Body focus more 
on achieving WTO’s liberalization policy in their decisions whereby giving 
purely judicial decision is compromised.
A. WTO’S DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM
The WTO dispute system has taken the experience of dispute resolution 
under the GATT 1947 as a basis for its development.33 Article 3.1 of the DSU 
has referred to the two provisions of GATT 1947 on dispute settlement (Ar-
ticle XXII and XXIII) and declared adherence to them. Since there were only 
two provisions on GATT 1947 dealing with dispute settlement, there were 
many gaps and shortcomings in the resolution system. For instance, it was 
only when findings and conclusions of panels were adopted by consensus 
by the GATT council that they became legally binding. Thus, a single party, 
typically the party having lost the case, could simply vote against the decision 
which is unfavourable to it and prevent the decision from becoming legally 
binding upon it.34 Hence, there was a need to transform the rules on dispute 
settlement to ensure they cope up with the system’s progress and members’ 
expectations.
The Understanding on rules and procedures for the settlement of disputes 
(DSU) came as a result of the Uruguay Round negotiation on the WTO dis-
pute settlement system. The DSU remedied the major shortcomings of the 
GATT dispute settlement system. WTO’s DSS neither requires consensus for 
the adoption of panel reports nor does it enable a single member to prevent the 
30  Ibid., 201.
31  Ibid., 223.
32  Ibid., 201, 202.
33  World Trade Organization,  “Historic Development of the WTO Dispute Settlement System”, Dispute 
Settlement System Training Module, accessed 13 August 2019,  https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c2s1p1_e.htm.
34  van den Bossche & Zdouc, 167.
Political Decision within the WTO Dispute Settlement
51
adoption.35 Hence, unlike GATT’s system, one Member opposing the adoption 
of the report is not sufficient, nor is a majority. Instead, a consensus against 
the adoption by all Members represented at the relevant DSB meeting should 
be reached to reject or not to adopt the panel report.36 The vote of one single 
Member is sufficient enough to secure the adoption of the panel report.37
Dispute settlement is one of the major functions of WTO as per Article III 
(3) of the WTO agreement. Moreover, Article 3.2 of the DSU provides that 
WTO’s dispute settlement is an essential element to provide security and pre-
dictability to the multilateral trading system. The WTO dispute settlement has 
two major purposes: preserving the rights and obligations of members under 
the various WTO agreements and clarifying the existing provisions of those 
agreements.
Since WTO’s establishment in 1995 and the adoption of the DSU, 595 
disputes were brought to the WTO for resolution and with over 350 rulings 
issued38 making the WTO dispute settlement system the most active of all cur-
rently operating international dispute settlement systems involving states as 
parties.39 From the total disputes brought to the WTO as of 2016, one-fifth of 
the cases were resolved without recourse to adjudication through other ways 
such as consultations.40 Moreover, there is a relatively high rate of compliance 
by respondents in most disputes as they had withdrawn or modified a WTO- 
inconsistent measure when required to do so.41
Article 1(1) of the DSU provides that the WTO dispute settlement system 
has jurisdiction over disputes between WTO members arising in relation to 
the covered agreements. The covered agreements are referred to in Appendix 
1 of the DSU and they include the WTO agreement, the GATT 1994, and all 
other multilateral agreements on trade in goods, the GATS, the TRIPS agree-
ment, the DSU, and the plurilateral agreement on Government procurement. 
Despite its promising progress since WTO’s creation, the Dispute Settle-
ment System’s relative success is not free from criticisms. There are claims 
that WTO has not been able to mitigate the imbalance between its adjudicat-
ing bodies with the relatively effective legal decision-making process and its 
35 World Trade Organization, “The Process – Stages in a Typical WTO Dispute Settlement Case” WTO, 




38 WTO, “Dispute Settlement”, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm (Accessed on 
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political bodies with ineffective political decision-making tendencies.42
B. CRITICISMS IN THE AFTERMATH OF PROGRESS OF THE 
WTO DSS 
WTO’s DSS is part of a system whose membership is open only for states 
and its access made available only to WTO member countries. International 
organizations, non-governmental organizations, associations, companies, or 
individuals are automatically excluded from having access to WTO dispute 
settlement. States, by their nature, give politically-motivated decisions either 
in their international relations with other states or in executing their nation-
al policy objectives, and they justify their decisions using international law 
and safeguarding of public interest, respectively. Since trade relations among 
states became essential owing to globalization, almost all states are very sensi-
tive to measures taken by another state and which affect trade. The state taking 
the measures justifies its action based on the WTO Agreements while the other 
side claims that the measures are not in line with their agreement denies the 
validity of these justifications. This is where the politicization of the WTO 
rules starts to take place whereby members seek ways to achieve their national 
policy objectives based on international law or WTO Agreements.
Despite attempts made to strike a balance between the relative successes 
and well-functioning of the dispute settlement system with its adjudicative 
bodies on the one hand, and the existence of consensus-based political deci-
sion-making at the WTO on the other, it is improbable to think of the dispute 
settlement system totally free from the involvement of politics. To begin with, 
the DSU instructs that members should adhere to consultation with each other 
as a diplomatic way of dispute settlement before applying for the establish-
ment of a panel.43 
The WTO dispute settlement system prefers members to resolve their dis-
pute through consultations, resulting in a mutually acceptable solution, rather 
than through adjudication. If a Member considers that the preconditions for 
resorting to the dispute settlement process have been fulfilled, it has to start 
the process of consultation.44 WTO’s jurisprudence also reaffirms the provi-
sions of the DSU about the requirement of consultation.45 It turns out that con-
42  Thomas A. Zimmermann, Negotiating the Review of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (Cam-
eron May, 2005), 81.
43  Article 4 of the DSU.
44  Article 4(3) of the DSU.
45  For instance, the Appellate Body in US – Upland Cotton case observed that “Articles 4 and 6 of the DSU 
set forth a process by which a complaining party must request consultations, and consultations must be 
held, before a matter may be referred to the DSB for the establishment of a panel”- World Trade Organiza-
tion, Dispute Settlement Reports, Vol. 1,  2005 (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 107.
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sultations are not a matter of choice but are obligatory preconditions before 
requesting the establishment of a panel. If consultations do not resolve the 
dispute within sixty days after the request for consultations, the complainant 
may request the DSB to establish a panel.46 The DSB may refuse to establish 
the panel if the mandatory procedure of consultation of the DSU as clarified 
by the WTO jurisprudence is neglected by a member if this member directly 
requests for the establishment of a panel.
As part of the pledged adherence to Articles XXII (Consultation)   and 
XXIII (Nullification or Impairment) of GATT under the DSU, Article 4.5 of 
the DSU underlines the importance of consultation among member states in 
their effort to achieve mutually satisfactory arrangements and solve their trade 
disputes without the need to resort to other actions under the DSU. WTO does 
not differ from GATT’s system in its basic objective of dispute settlement 
process as both systems emphasize resolution and consistency with the under-
lying rules.47  Hence, the two GATT Articles as well as Article 4 and 5 of the 
DSU share a common goal in that they all give recognition for the need to fol-
low “consultative procedures and pre-panel settlements” by parties, provided 
all are presumed to act in good faith.48   
Disputing parties are required to consider requests for consultation regard-
ing disagreements over cover agreements and engage in consultative media-
tion which may take place simultaneously with a panel process.49  Pursuant 
to Article 5.5 of the DSU, consultative mediation presupposes agreement of 
the parties and takes place in the form of good offices, conciliation, or media-
tion. The discretion of parties to engage in consultations at any time before or 
during the panel proceedings coupled with the confidentiality of the process 
enabled states to use diplomacy to resort to diplomacy when deemed neces-
sary. This is one instance of the political negotiation-oriented elements within 
WTO whereby Member states seek resolution under the rubric of diplomacy 
instead of rules. 
Since WTO’s establishment in 1995, there have been several disputes that 
have been subjects of much controversy and which gave rise to considerable 
public debates attracting much media attention. The ‘EC-Bananas III’ case, 
one of WTO’s most fervent trade conflicts, was concluded in 2012 when the 
disputant parties notified WTO that they have reached a mutual agreement 
46  Article 4 (7) of the DSU.
47  Saadia M. Pekkanen, “Sword and Shield: The WTO Dispute Settlement System and Japan,” The Japa-
nese Economy 28 no. 5, (2000): 6. https://doi.org/10.2753/JES1097-203X28053 (Accessed on 02 May 
2020)




following confidential consultations that took place while the case was being 
entertained by WTO’s adjudicating bodies.50 The issue of this case concerned 
the adoption of a Common Market Organization for bananas by the European 
Communities (hereinafter EC) in 1993. Complainant states alleged that “the 
EC’s regime for importation, sale and distribution of bananas is inconsistent 
with GATT Articles I, II, III, X, XI and XIII as well as provisions of the Import 
Licensing Agreement, the Agreement on Agriculture, the TRIMs Agreement 
and the GATS.”51 The import regime consisted of various measures for the 
importation, distribution, and sale of bananas whose application allegedly af-
fected bananas imported from third countries to the exclusion of 12 African, 
Caribbean, and Pacific (“ACP”) countries which either have traditionally ex-
ported bananas to the European Communities or that were not traditional sup-
pliers of the EC market.52 
It is not clear how parties reached an agreement and what the terms of 
their agreement are regarding the measures taken by the respondent. Before 
this notification was made to WTO’s DSB by the parties, the EU was said to 
only have made cosmetic alterations to its illegal banana regime ignoring the 
core WTO rulings on the issue at hand.53 The confidentiality of consultation 
procedures under WTO’s DSU has enabled both parties to keep their agree-
ments secret leaving the question of whether WTO rules under the covered 
agreements were complied with by the parties or not unanswered. This case 
is a sound example to show that members would be unable or unwilling to 
comply in specific cases under WO dispute settlement decisions; they instead 
might set aside the decision and deal with the issue politically (diplomatic 
ways). 
In the contemporary world legal order, it seems almost impossible to think 
of a purely law-based legal process with no attachment to politics of any form. 
That is why some scholars like the proponents of the Critical Legal Studies 
movement, a movement “marked by a rejection of the belief that legal argu-
ment can or should be an enterprise distinct from political argument”,54 seek 
to re-strengthen political control of WTO dispute settlement and to weaken 
its adjudication character. The CLS school of thought strongly advocates that 
50  World Trade Organization, “DS27: European Communities — Regime for the Importation, Sale and Dis-
tribution of Bananas,” WTO, accessed 3 May 2020, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/
ds27_e.htm.
51  World Trade Organization, “Summary of DS27,” accessed on 03 May 2020, https://www.wto.org/eng-
lish/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds27_jmp_test_e.htm#summary. 
52  WTO, “EC-Bananas III (DS27) Summary” WTO, accessed on 03 May 2020 https://www.wto.org/eng-
lish/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/1pagesum_e/ds27sum_e.pdf 
53  Helmedach & Zangl, “Dispute Settlement Under GATT,” 105.
54  David Andrew Price, “Taking Rights Cynically: A Review of Critical Legal Studies,” Cambridge Law 
Journal 48, no. 2 (July, 1989): 271.
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legal arguments of such an international law system should not be seen distinct 
from political arguments. Instead, the judicial decisions of the dispute settle-
ment system have to be based on the assumption that legal reasoning is the 
result of not just written rigid rules but mainly based on social, political, institu-
tional, experiential, and personal factors. This is true regardless of whether the 
decision-maker expressly admits it or rather denies the impact of these factors 
on the decision and tries to justify the final outcome based on rules that have 
been objectively and rationally found and applied to unequivocal facts. 
If strict judicial procedures were sufficient enough by themselves to make 
a legal system effective without being backed by the necessary political sup-
port, it would have been very easy for the WTO dispute settlement system to 
achieve 100% compliance. Despite WTO’s complex DSS and stringent proce-
dural rules, the effectiveness of the outcomes of the process and the practical 
impact of the principle of ‘equality before the law’ among states under WTO’s 
trade regime are significantly influenced by the political will of member states. 
Here, it is worth discussing the two related cases concerning subsidies given 
to Airbus and Boeing: ‘EC and Certain Member States- Large Civil Aircraft 
(2011) (‘Airbus’)’ and ‘US- Large Civil Aircraft (2012) (‘Boeing’)’. On 6 Oc-
tober 2004, the United States requested consultations with the Governments 
of Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Spain, and with the European 
Communities EC concerning measures affecting trade in large civil aircraft.55 
The US claimed that the EC and its member states were subsidizing Airbus in a 
manner that is inconsistent with GATT 1994 and SCM Agreement. 
Kienstra (2012) reiterated that even before a formal request for consultation 
was made to the WTO, 
“the US and EC increasingly scrutinized subsidies provided by their coun-
terpart to its respective aircraft manufacturer. The conflict over subsidies, 
which had persisted between the two since the inception of Airbus in 1970, 
reached a head in 2004 when the US initiated dispute resolution process at 
the WTO over subsidies provided by EC to Airbus.”56 
Then the EU responded to the US’s claims by filing a parallel complaint 
claiming that the US provided unlawful subsidies to Boeing. The dispute 
reached ahead in 2010 and 2011 when the WTO ruled that both Boeing and Air-
bus had collected millions in unlawful assistance of different forms. Boeing got 
55  WTO, “DS316: European Communities and Certain member States — Measures Affecting Trade in Large 
Civil Aircraft,” WTO, accessed on 26 October 2019, 
 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds316_e.htm.
56  Jeffrey D. Kienstra, “Cleared for Landing: Airbus, Boeing, and the WTO Dispute over Subsidies to Large 
Civil Aircraft,” Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 32, no. 3 (2012): 569.
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assistance from government contracts for defence and space business as well 
as tax breaks whereas Airbus secured the assistance in various ways including 
through aid to launch aircraft programmes that were repayable on delivery.57
These two cases involved top officials of both the US and EC countries 
and have been on-going for the past 15 years, becoming the two biggest and 
complex cases WTO handled to date.58 These disputes, which some parties 
claim to be ‘ cases which serve to remind WTO members that the Dispute Set-
tlement System still works’, have been termed as  ‘long-running, high stakes 
and fact-insensitive’ disputes.59 In 2019, the DSB authorized the US to impose 
countermeasures on EU goods and services up to a value of USD 7,496.623 
million annually in line with a WTO arbitrator decision.60 Regarding the re-
sponse claim made by the EC against the US, the complainant has been re-
ported to have filed an appeal on 6 December 2019 against the findings of the 
compliance panel.61
These complex and intertwined cases are still going on and are taking 
longer to be solved not just because the WTO lacks the professional ability 
to entertain such cases but because the parties involved are head-to-head with 
each other and continue to subsidize the companies at issue when the WTO is 
working to settle their disputes. The disputing parties consider WTO DSS not 
just as a mechanism for ensuring respect for WTO rules or multilateral trade 
arrangements, rather they use it as an instrument for achieving their national 
economic objectives and political interests by ensuring the superiority of their 
companies in the market and making use of the platform to make sure that 
they are advantageous in any way possible.
Another WTO case that clearly shows how WTO’s complex procedural 
rules can be manipulated by Members for their interest by taking advantage 
of DSU-recognized mechanisms such as confidential consultations before or 
during the panel proceedings is the US - Clove Cigarettes Case.62 Following 
the adoption of a Control Act banning the production and sale of Clove ciga-
57  Ibid.,570, 571.
58  van den Bossche & Zdouc, The Law and Policy of WTO,  167.
59  Peggy Hollinger, ‘What is at stake in WTO ruling on Airbus-Boeing trade dispute?’, Financial Times 
(October 2, 2019), accesssed 24 November 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/de3f9c12-e3a0-11e9-9743-
db5a370481bc.
60  World Trade Organization, “Members Give US Green light to Impose countermeasures on EU in Air-
craft Subsidy Dispute” WTO accessed 2 November 2019, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news19_e/
dsb_14oct19_e.htm. 
61  World Trade Organization, “European Union appeals second compliance panel ruling in Airbus dispute,” 
Accessed 7 December 2019, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news19_e/ds316oth_06dec19_e.htm.
62 WTO, “DS406: United States — Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes,” WTO, 
accessed on 13 August 2019,  https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds406_e.htm.
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rettes except for menthol cigarettes by the US in 2009,63 Indonesia requested 
consultations with the US claiming that the act contained provisions that were 
inconsistent with the US’s obligation under WTO covered agreements. The 
US claimed the Act was meant to be to reduce youth smoking in the country. 
Indonesia, one of the top producers of clove cigarettes imported to the US, 
claimed that the measure was inconsistent with WTO’s non-discrimination 
principle as it accorded a less favorable treatment to imported clove cigarettes 
than the one accorded to like domestic cigarettes. Because the Act adopted 
still allowed the production and sale of menthol-flavored cigarettes, Indonesia 
further alleged that the measure was more restrictive than necessary to fulfill 
a legitimate objective.64
The WTO Panel found that, because menthol-flavored and clove-flavored 
products are ‘like products’ and the ban at issue only restricts the production 
and sale of clove-flavored ones, the specific section under US’s Control Act is 
inconsistent with the national treatment obligation in Article 2.1 of the TBT 
Agreement.65 However, although the ban treated clove cigarettes less favor-
ably than menthol-flavored cigarettes, the panel ruled that held that it was 
consistent with the TBT Agreement as Indonesia failed to demonstrate that it 
was more trade-restrictive than necessary to satisfy the legitimate objective 
of reducing youth smoking.66 While upholding most findings of the panel, 
the Appellate Body found “that the design, architecture, revealing structure, 
operation, and application of Section 907(a)(1)(A) strongly suggest that the 
detrimental impact on competitive opportunities for clove cigarettes reflects 
discrimination against the group of like products imported from Indonesia”.67 
Overall, Indonesia won the case as it was finally found that the policy was 
discriminatory because the law still allowed for the sale of menthol cigarettes 
(menthol cigarettes are mainly produced within the US). On 3 October 2014, 
the two nations notified the WTO that they have reached a mutually agreed 
solution68 which would enable the US to keep the discriminatory ban. Indone-
sia opted to negotiate with the US and further set up a framework to resolve 
several trade disputes between them.69 
This case is very significant to show how states can manipulate the WTO 
63  US, Family Smoking Prevention Tobacco Control Act of 2009
64  WTO, “DS406: ANNEX A, Executive Summaries of the First Written Submissions of the Parties,” ac-
cessed 13 August 2019, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/406r_a_e.pdf.









DSS and make things work in their favour. Despite the decision by the DSB, 
the US refused to comply with the decision and kept the ban, it then agreed 
to negotiate with Indonesia. This is a political movement whose outcome is 
most likely influenced by the policies and priorities of the two governments 
rather than written rules. Political decisions play a very important role in the 
execution of most international laws and agreements as the interests at stake 
are very significant.
WTO’s DSU has a quasi-automatic architecture that allows Member states 
to “exact decisions on politically highly sensitive issues from the dispute set-
tlement system.”70 Moreover, the Appellate Body has been criticized for its 
rulings on some trade remedy cases where it is alleged to have exceeded its 
authority and legislating instead of adjudicating by carefully examining Mem-
bers’ trade policy decisions.71 The criticism comes from the presumption that 
WTO’s adjudicating bodies are biased towards trade liberalization.72
Many scholars such as Hammond (2012) agree that WTO suffers from 
an institutional imbalance between its judicial branch and its political ‘rule-
making’ branch.73 This imbalance can be attributed to various factors includ-
ing the fact that while WTO’s adjudicating bodies have developed efficiently, 
its decision-making and rule-making systems have not progressed at the same 
pace. 
The WTO DSS can be said to have, in the words of Zimmermann (2007), 
“…a codified procedure that combines elements of both political negotia-
tion and adjudication. In the current mechanism, the political negotiation-
oriented elements include, inter alia, mandatory confidential consulta-
tions, tactical elements during the panel stage (establishment of panels 
only at second meeting where the panel request appears on the DSB 
agenda, possibility to suspend the panel procedures upon complainant’s 
request, interim review), and the subordination of the entire procedure to 
a “political” body, as the competence to adopt panel and Appellate Body 
reports rests with the Dispute Settlement Body.”74
“…. Rule-oriented elements include, inter alia, the conformity and noti-
fication requirements with regard to mutually agreed solutions; the right 
70  Thomas A. Zimmermann, “WTO Dispute Settlement: General Appreciation and the Role of India,” in 
WTO and Dispute Resolution¸ K. Padmaja, ed. (Punjagutta: The Ifcai University Press, 2007), 164.
71  Ibid.
72  Ibid.
73  Felicity Hammond, “A Balancing Act: Using WTO Dispute Settlement to Resolve Regional Trade 
Agreement Disputes,” Trade Law and Development (2012): 427.
74  Zimmermann, 151.
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to a panel (more generally: the removal of blocking possibilities in the 
process); the appellate review stage; and the prohibition of unauthorised, 
unilateral retaliatory action.”75
The system in general is the outcome of the procedural interaction of ele-
ments of political negotiations on the one hand and judicial rules of adjudica-
tion on the other hand. Besides, since WTO’s rule-making body has been in 
a deadlock for a quite long time now, the DSS may also succumb to judicial 
activism as a response to the evolving needs of WTO members and the neces-
sity to deal with such demands. If this is the case and if WTO’s rule-making 
branch continues to be in stalemate, the aim of WTO’s DSS to attain more 
judicialization and less politicization is not far from being a mere wish whose 
possibility of becoming true is not in the near future.
IV. CONCLUSION
The WTO dispute settlement system has been operational for more than 
two decades now and it has achieved an unexpected success throughout these 
years. But, this doesn’t mean the system was free from drawbacks and flaws. 
It has been criticized for structurally incorporating political procedures while 
its bodies work towards ‘judicialization’ through ‘pure’ legal reasoning. When 
the panel and the Appellate Body carry out their responsibility of giving ju-
dicial decisions based on the DSU for procedural rules and the WTO Agree-
ments it seems almost impossible for these bodies to interpret these Agree-
ments and legal instruments without the involvement of politics.
WTO’s membership is open for all sovereign states and it is these states 
that have access to the WTO dispute settlement system. Because states, by 
their nature, give politically-motivated decisions either in their international 
relations with other states or in executing their national policy objectives, they 
manipulate international law to their advantage and justify their actions based 
on the safeguarding of public interest. Even if attempts are being made to 
strike a balance between the pressing interests of states on the one hand and 
the judicialization of WTO’s DSS on the other hand, the system is highly 
influenced by the political moves made by states. The other important issue 
worth noting is the fact that the DSB is a political body that is responsible for 
leading WTO’s DSS and adopting panel and Appellate Body reports. This 
in turn gives room for the mixing of politics with the judicial system of the 
organization.
75  Ibid., 152.
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The paper has briefly discussed how regulation of trade evolved in the 
progress of international law, what the WTO Dispute Settlement System is, 
how political decisions influence the decisions given by the adjudicating bod-
ies of the WTO, and what this means when examined in terms of WTO’s 
journey towards more judicialization. The WTO dispute settlement system, 
a system with a codified procedure that combines elements of both political 
negotiation and adjudication, cannot be expected to develop an adjudicative 
system whereby judicial decisions are made based on pure legal reasoning 
without being influenced by political decisions.
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